My last post has caused some controversy, and an especially vehement reply from Chris Skinner. I suggest you read his post, actually, before you read this one.
Now, the basic premise of my argument was this: Zopa has the potential to be a disruptive player, but isn't because it is behaving exactly like a bank. It is going after exactly the same customers as banks, using the same means of working out whether they are credit worthy or not, and then pricing loans in pretty much the same way a bank would do. Actually, Zopa loans are often more expensive than bank loans, because they have to make deposits attractive to people with money to lend compared to more traditional investment options.
Let me start by clarifying what I mean when I use that charged word "disruption". It is a word that has become much overused and much misunderstood, in my view. I use the Claytonesque definition which is this (thanks to Wikipedia):
disruptive innovation is a term used in business and technology literature to describe innovations that improves a product or service in ways that the market does not expect, typically by being lower priced or designed for a different set of consumers.
Disruptive innovations can be broadly classified into low-end and new-market disruptive innovations. A new-market disruptive innovation is often aimed at non-consumption (i.e., consumers who would not have used the products already on the market), whereas a lower-end disruptive innovation is aimed at mainstream customers for whom price is more important than quality.
Using this definition, Zopa is not disruptive on either count. They are targeting existing customers of banks who want a loan, firstly. To be a new market disruption, they would have to go after customers who wouldn't consider a traditional bank product, or who would not ordinarily be able to get one. And their loan pricing is certainly not that different from banks, and, indeed, cannot be so given they have to attract depositors from banking products to fund their loans.
Ergo, not disruptive. Note that I don't say cannot be disruptive. Only that they aren't right now.
Chris' chief argument against this is:
…most of these new businesses are based upon a model of social connection first, with finance second. This, to my mind, is the same as First Direct and PayPal, both of which are sustainable. First Direct was built upon a model of being a bank without branches built for the telephone channel. They were targeting the same customers as traditional banks but using a new channel for reach.
Chris introduces a new term here: sustainable. By which he means, I think, that these are businesses which have a future beyond the immediate short term. Now, I have to be clear, I have never once said that Zopa wasn't sustainable. I do believe it has a future, and in fact, I believe most of the new technologically driven banking things that are happening have a future.
What Zopa has, however, is a very thin line to walk. It can grow its business to a certain point, after which it will become material to the business of banks. Competitive pressure will force banks to respond, and that response will be on price. With the ability to cross-subsidise products, they will be able to compete on price far longer than the Zopa monoline will be able to do.
The penultimate point of my argument was that Zopa must know this, and therefore their strategy, in going head-to-head with banks, must be to grow to a certain size, and then no further. This, I admit is provocative, and I know no one really expects that Zopa has this in their brains. Actually, what I'm saying here is that Zopa's present strategy is focussed on the short term, and fails the more successful they get.
Chris then points out that Zopa passed the £50 million loans milestone, and that 40% of that has been this year alone. He suggests that this implies that Zopa is "taking off", and that the pace of growth is "quite remarkable".
It is amazing to me that everyone thinks this a remarkable performance when the big banks are turning away customers. Wouldn't you expect decent growth when incumbents stop supplying product? Actually, why isn't Zopa's performance hundreds of percent up from last year? Considering the pent up demand for lending, there surely must be some reason why everyone isn't flocking to Zopa. Could it be – wait for it – that the Zopa deal isn't all that different from a bank deal? If you can't get a loan from a bank, you can't get one from Zopa either.
Anyway, Chris then goes on to introduce another innovation-technical term: critical mass. That's the time, by the way, that a new idea becomes well enough adopted that you don't have to do anything to sustain further adoption. Usually, the evidence is that you get a period of exponential growth in usage, which quickly peaks somewhere short of 100% penetration over a period of years. Because the rate of change continues to accelerate, the number of years until critical mass occurs has tended to reduce.
As an average across categories, critical mass usually occurs when somewhere between 2.5% and 16% of a particular target market have adopted an innovation. Now lets examine again how ludicrous Chris's statements about critical mass are in the light of what Zopa would need to do in order to achieve it, thereby having a chance of damaging the banks in a way that could not be countered simply by competing on price.
Using Bank of England data, I compute that consumer credit excluding credit cards from May 2008 – May 2009 was about £2.5 Billion. Let's take the easiest case for critical mass first, where Zopa achieves just 2.5% of that, or in other words, writes £62.5 million pounds of loans in the last year. Their actual achievement is 80% of that in their whole lifetime. Some time to go before "critical mass" is reached, I think. But Chris hypothesises that Zopa could achieve that in two years, by 2011. The fact is, they haven't, even when being in the centre of a perfect storm for the incumbents making their business the most viable it could ever hope to be.
Now finally, let me finish off this post by clarifying one last thing. No group of banks is going to band together to "kill off" Zopa. But competitively, they will respond, and they'll make the battleground price if they start to lose significant share. This will be an automatic reaction and part of business as usual. Zopa cannot compete on price, because it is a monoline, firstly, and doesn't control the price of the capital it lends to the same degree that a bank does secondly. Therefore, if Zopa is forced into a price war on rates, it will lose.
Chris argues that it can win a price war because it has "razor thin margins". That's a stupid argument because it assumes that Zopa makes money through interest income, which it doesn't. It is a fee based business. Consumers care about fees, but firstly they buy on the basis of the interest rate. Zopa has control of fees, whereas banks have control of fees and the interest rates they charge.
Chris makes a few final parting shots at me by suggesting I am a luddite banker, and uses my previous suggestion that "twitter is a stunt for banks", whilst pointing out that I have adopted it personally as evidence that I have to be shown the wood for the trees before I'll support anything. I haven't changed my position on Twitter, by the way.
But I do have this to say, Chris. For someone who is retained regularly as an expert commentator on our industry your failure to see beyond banking-techno-gadgetry to reality is surprising to me. In fact, as you say, it is evidence that "Zopa Zealots and Smartypig Saints caught up in the church of the Internet" are alive and well.
Update: Chris corrects my maths, and I've changed my post to correct the error. But the change in the numbers doesn't have any effect on the argument, in my view.
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